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During this Survey period,1 both the Texas Supreme Court and U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit were particularly active in address-
ing questions of insurance law. Some of the more significant topics ad-
dressed by these courts related to whether an insured must demonstrate
independent injury to recover under Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance
Code; the scope of the Stowers doctrine; whether the scope of additional
insured coverage can be limited by reference to an underlying contract;
whether an exception exists to the “eight-corners” rule in determining the
duty to defend; application of the vacancy clause and anti-concurrent-
causation exclusion in a commercial property policy; and the scope of the
contractual liability exclusion in commercial general liability policies.
Courts continued to evaluate issues regarding the necessary and proper
parties to coverage litigation. Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court pro-
vided guidance on the scope of discovery permissible in assessing whether
an insurer properly adjusted a property claim.
II. EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. TEXAS INSURANCE CODE CHAPTER 541—UNFAIR METHODS OF
COMPETITION AND UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR
PRACTICES (CHAPTER 541)2
1. Whether Insured Must Show Independent Injury to Maintain a
Chapter 541 Claim
During this Survey period, several courts addressed whether an insured
is required to show an injury independent from the denial of policy bene-
fits to prevail on a cause of action under Chapter 541. Chapter 541 pro-
vides for a private cause of action by an insured against an insurer for
“actual damages” caused by an insurer’s “unfair method of competition
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1. This Article encompasses opinions issued between November 1, 2013 and October
31, 2015.
2. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. ch. 541 (West 2015).
199
200 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 2
or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance.”3 In
In re Deepwater Horizon, the insured appealed the district court’s dismis-
sal of the Chapter 541 claim where it sought only the policy benefits and
the attorney’s fees incurred for the coverage litigation.4 The insured ar-
gued that the district court should have followed Vail v. Texas Farm Bu-
reau Mutual Insurance Co.,5 where the Texas Supreme Court held that an
insured “need not show any injury independent from the denied policy
benefits.”6
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit emphasized
that subsequent decisions “arguably cast doubt on Vail’s continued vital-
ity.”7 The Fifth Circuit noted that it had previously relied on “a more
recent case from the Supreme Court of Texas,” Provident American In-
surance Co. v. Castaneda,8 “as setting out the opposite rule from Vail.”9
Recent decisions from Texas intermediate appellate courts, however,
have indicated that Vail, not Castaneda, controls and have rejected the
independent injury requirement.10 Recognizing that there is a split of au-
thority on this important question of Texas state law, the Fifth Circuit
certified the following question to the Texas Supreme Court: “Whether,
to maintain a cause of action under Chapter 541 . . . against an insurer
that wrongfully withheld policy benefits, an insured must allege and
prove an injury independent from the denied policy benefits?”11
B. TEXAS INSURANCE CODE CHAPTER 542—PROCESSING AND
SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS (CHAPTER 542)12
1. Fifth Circuit Ruled That Violation of Any Chapter 542 Deadline
Triggers the Accrual of Statutory Interest
For the stated purpose of “promot[ing] the prompt payment of insur-
ance claims,” Chapter 542 sets forth deadlines governing an insurer’s han-
dling of first-party claims.13 Section 542.058 provides that if any insurer
delays payment for more than sixty days “after receiving all items, state-
3. Id. §§ 541.003, 541.151.
4. In re Deepwater Horizon, 807 F.3d 689, 697 (5th Cir. 2015).
5. 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
6. In re Deepwater Horizon, 807 F.3d at 697 (emphasis omitted).
7. Id. at 698.
8. 988 S.W.2d 189, 198–99 (Tex. 1998).
9. In re Deepwater Horizon, 807 F.3d at 698 (citing Great Am. Ins. Co. v. AFS/BEX
Fin. Servs., Inc., 612 F.3d 800, 808 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2010)).
10. Id. (citing United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. AMJ Invs., LLC, 447 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. dism’d) (independent injury not required); USAA Tex.
Lloyd’s Co. v. Menchaca, No. 13-13-00046-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 8250, at *35 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi July 31, 2014, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (relying on Vail, 754 S.W.2d
129)). But see Admiral Ins. Co. v. Petron Energy, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 501, 503–04 (N.D. Tex.
2014) (applying independent injury requirement and granting summary judgment for in-
surer where insured sought only policy benefits and expenses incurred in the coverage
litigation).
11. In re Deepwater Horizon, 807 F.3d at 698, 701.
12. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. ch. 542 (West 2015).
13. Id. §§ 542.054–542.057.
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ments, and forms reasonably requested and required . . . the insurer shall
pay damages and other items as provided by Section 542.060.”14 Section
542.060 makes the insurer liable for 18 percent annual interest on the
amount of the claim and for the insured’s reasonable attorney’s fees.15
In Cox Operating, L.L.C. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Co., the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the penal-
ties under § 542.060 can be imposed only for a violation of § 542.058 or
for any violation of the statutory deadlines.16 The insured sought cover-
age for costs it incurred in cleaning up from damage due to Hurricane
Katrina. After reimbursing the insured for $1.4 million, the insurer filed
suit “seeking a declaration that the remainder of [the] costs” were not
covered.17 The jury found that the insurer “failed to commence an inves-
tigation or request [items from the insured] within 30 days” of the in-
sured’s notice of the claim, in violation of § 542.055.18 Reasoning that the
insurer’s failure to request information signaled to the insured that the
initial notice was all that was necessary, the district court concluded that
the statutory interest began accruing sixty days after the notice date.
Judgment was entered against the insurer for around $9.5 million in con-
tractual damages and around $13.1 million in penalty interest.19
On appeal, the insurer challenged only the determination of the accrual
date, arguing that because only § 542.058, and none of the other dead-
lines, imposes penalty interest under § 542.060, interest does not begin to
accrue on a particular cost until sixty days after the date the insurer re-
ceived the invoice supporting that cost.20 In rejecting this argument, the
Fifth Circuit acknowledged the absence of express language in any of the
other statutory sections tying a violation of its deadline to the penalty
interest under § 542.060, but dismissed this as a “disturbing inconsis-
tency” in the statute.21 The Fifth Circuit instead reasoned that reading the
statute as imposing interest only for a violation of § 542.058, but not for
violation of other statutory deadlines, would render the other deadlines
toothless and inoperative.22 The Fifth Circuit therefore concluded that,
“[n]otwithstanding § 542.058’s specific reference to penalty interest . . .
[Chapter 542] as a whole is clear: a violation of any of the Act’s deadlines
. . . triggers the accrual of statutory interest under § 542.060.”23
14. Id. § 542.058.
15. Id. § 542.060.
16. Cox Operating, L.L.C. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 795 F.3d 496, 505–09 (5th
Cir. 2015).
17. Id. at 498.
18. Id. at 506.
19. Id. at 498.
20. Id. at 506.
21. Id. at 507 (quoting Devonshire Real Estate & Asset Mgmt., L.P. v. Am. Ins. Co.,
No. 3:12-CV-2199-B, 2014 WL 4796967, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2014)).
22. Id. at 507–08 (quoting Devonshire, 2014 WL 4796967, at *21; City of San Antonio
v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003)).
23. Id. at 508.
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C. STOWERS LIABILITY24
1. Stowers Does Not Require Insurer to Accept Settlement Demand
That Does Not Fully Release Insured from All Claims
The First Houston Court of Appeals revisited the requirements for a
settlement demand to trigger an insurer’s duty to settle under Stowers.25
The claimant sued the insured for the wrongful death of his wife, and
during the course of the litigation, he sent the insured’s liability insurer
two settlement demands—the first for the insurer to pay its policy limits
to the children of the claimant and the deceased, and the second for the
insurer to pay its policy limits to the claimant.26 The insurer declined both
proposals, interpleaded its limits, and was granted a release and dis-
charge. The claimant and the insured subsequently entered into a settle-
ment agreement, under which the claimant agreed not to execute on a
judgment against the insured in exchange for the insured’s assignment of
its claims against the insurer.27 Following a post-answer default judgment
against the insured, the claimant sued the insurer under Stowers, alleging
that it had negligently failed to settle the wrongful death suit.
Under Stowers, “insurers have a common-law duty to exercise ordinary
care in the settlement of claims to protect their insureds against judg-
ments in excess of policy limits.”28 To trigger the Stowers duty to settle,
the settlement offer must be unconditional and must propose to fully re-
lease the insured.29 The court of appeals explained that the claimant’s
two settlement offers “did not propose to fully release [the insured], as
[the insured] would still have been liable to an excess judgment to either
[the claimant], his children, or his wife’s estate, whichever was not named
in the settlement demand.”30 The court of appeals further reasoned that
had the insurer paid the policy to settle with only one of the claimants, it
“could have potentially exposed [the insured] to an excess judgment by
one of the other claimants.”31 The court of appeals therefore held that
the “settlement offers did not trigger [the insurer’s] Stowers duty to set-
tle” and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
insurer.32
Interestingly, the court of appeals’s analysis did not mention Texas
Farmers Insurance Co. v. Soriano,33 in which the Texas Supreme Court
held that an insurer which enters into a reasonable settlement with one
24. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm’n App.
1929, no writ.).
25. Patterson v. Home State Cnty. & Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01-12-00365-CV, 2014 Tex.
App. LEXIS 4460, at *18–27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 24, 2014 2014, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).
26. Id. at *1–2.
27. Id. at *5.
28. Id. at *18.
29. Id. at *23.
30. Id. at *23–24.
31. Id. at *24.
32. Id. at *24, *28.
33. 881 S.W.2d 312 (1994).
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claimant does not violate Stowers, even if insufficient limits are left to
resolve other claims.34 The current rule thus appears to be that an insurer
is permitted, but is not required, to accept a settlement demand that does
not release the insured from all liability as to all claimants.
III. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
1. Texas Supreme Court Holds Additional Insured Endorsement
Incorporates Limitations on the Scope of Coverage Within
Underlying Contract
The Texas Supreme Court addressed whether coverage for an addi-
tional insured can be limited in scope and to amounts designated in an
underlying contract between the named insured and additional insured.
In re Deepwater Horizon arose out of the April 2010 sinking of the Deep-
water Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico.35 BP sought coverage
for the resulting personal injury and property damage claims under the
primary and excess liability policies issued to Transocean, who was the
drilling-rig owner. Transocean’s insurer did not dispute whether BP was
an additional insured; rather, the dispute centered on whether “BP is en-
titled to coverage for liabilities it expressly assumed in the [drilling con-
tract it has with Transocean].”36
Transocean was required to procure liability insurance for BP only “for
liabilities assumed by [Transocean] under the terms of [the drilling con-
tract].”37 Responsibility for pollution-related liabilities at or above the
water surface was allocated to Transocean under an indemnity provision
in the drilling contract. In another indemnity provision in the drilling con-
tract, BP assumed responsibility for any pollution liabilities not assumed
by Transocean.
The additional insured provisions in the policies expanded the defini-
tion of “Insured” to anyone whom Transocean was “obliged by any oral
or written ‘Insured Contract’ . . . to provide insurance.”38 The insurers
argued that this policy language required reference to the drilling con-
tract for the scope of additional insured coverage, and that because
Transocean had not assumed liability for subsea pollution, BP was not
insured for that liability. BP argued the existence and scope of additional
insured coverage must be evaluated exclusively from the policies’ terms,
and that no limitation existed on the scope of coverage for the pollution
claims.
The supreme court found that while its initial analysis must begin with
the language from the policies, that language required reference to the
34. Id. at 315.
35. In re Deepwater Horizon, 470 S.W.3d 452, 456 (Tex. 2015).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 457.
38. Id. The parties did not dispute that Transocean was obliged to procure insurance
for BP under the terms of the drilling contract. Id. at 458.
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underlying drilling contract to determine the status and scope of addi-
tional insured coverage.39 Thus, the coverage for BP was limited to the
amounts and type required by the drilling contract because its status as an
additional insured was “inextricably intertwined with limitations on the
extent of coverage to be afforded under the Transocean policies.”40 Be-
cause BP had assumed responsibility for the subsea pollution, Transocean
was not required under the drilling contract to provide additional insured
coverage to BP for that liability.41 As a result, the supreme court held
that BP was not an additional insured with respect to the claims and dam-
ages related to the subsea pollution.42
2. Texas Supreme Court Finds that EPA Notice Letters Can Constitute
“Suit”
In McGinnes Industrial Maintenance Corp. v. Phoenix Insurance Co.,
the Texas Supreme Court analyzed the meaning of the term “suit” in the
commercial general liability context.43 In 2009, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) notified the insured via special notice letter that
the insured was responsible for site cleanup and reimbursement costs
based on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) resulting from dumping activities
the insured committed in the 1960s. The EPA eventually issued a unilat-
eral order directing the insured to perform its own investigation of reme-
dial steps in accordance with EPA specifications. The EPA also warned
that a failure to comply would subject the insured to civil penalties and
punitive damages.44 The insured sought coverage from its insurers.
The policies required the insurer “to defend any suit against [an] in-
sured seeking damages on account of . . . property damage.”45 Unlike
most modern general liability (GL) policies, the policies at issue did not
define the term, suit. The insurers denied coverage, claiming that the
EPA letters and CERCLA proceeding did not constitute a suit in the
traditional sense of the term.46 The insured filed a coverage lawsuit,
which ultimately reached the Fifth Circuit, who certified the following
question to the supreme court: “Whether the EPA’s [notice] letters and/
or unilateral administrative order, issued pursuant to CERCLA, consti-
tute a ‘suit’ within the meaning of the CGL policies, triggering the duty to
39. Id. at 455, 460, 462.
40. Id. at 455–56.
41. See id. at 464–65.
42. Id. at 467–68; see also Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co. v. Aspen Underwriting, Ltd.,
788 F.3d 456, 457 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying In re Deepwater Horizon and holding that the
amount of insurance oil well service company was obligated to provide for oil rig owner
was limited to that amount identified in the master service agreement between the parties).
43. McGinnes Indus. Maint. Corp. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 477 S.W.3d 786, 787 (Tex.
2015).
44. Id. at 790.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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defend.”47
Though agreeing with the insurers and conceding that the term, suit,
usually refers to a proceeding in court, the supreme court answered the
certified question “yes” for three reasons.48 First, at the time the policies
were written, which was in an era before the existence of the EPA or
CERCLA, lawsuits were required to enforce pollution laws.49 Under
modern laws, however, the supreme court reasoned that EPA letters and
proceedings are, “in actuality, . . . the suit itself.”50 The supreme court
identified parallels between the EPA proceedings and actual litigation,
including the similarities between the PRP letters and pleadings, the
EPA’s use of discovery to obtain information, use of mediation to at-
tempt settlement, administrative orders that resemble summary judg-
ments, and fines and penalties that function in a similar manner to
sanctions in civil litigation.51 The supreme court also rejected the notion
that its ruling would impose a duty to defend in response to every de-
mand letter to an insured.52
Second, the supreme court noted that “relatively well-settled” law ex-
ists that CERCLA cleanup costs constitute damages as contemplated by
the policies at issue.53 The supreme court added that “To interpret the
policies as covering the damages incurred as a result of pollution cleanup
proceedings without giving the Insurers the right and duty to defend
those proceedings creates perverse incentives and consequences for in-
surers and insureds alike.”54
Finally, the supreme court decided—in an effort to “strive for uniform-
ity as much as possible”55—to join the thirteen other state high courts
that have adopted this broad interpretation of the term, suits, explaining
that “insureds in Texas should not be deprived the coverage insureds
have in [those] states.”56 Nevertheless, the supreme court recognized in
its opinion that high courts in California, Illinios, and Maine have actually
sided with the interpretation of suits put forward by the insurer, meaning
that complete uniformity was impossible.57
47. Id.
48. Id. at 791.
49. Id.
50. Id. The supreme court noted that potentially responsible parties (PRPs) have no
practical hope for relief in light of CERCLA, and that the PRPs have essentially no choice
but to comply with the EPA. Id. at 789.
51. Id. at 791.
52. Id. at 792.
53. Id.
54. Id. Seemingly at odds with this statement, under Texas law an insurer can have a
duty to indemnify even if it has no duty to defend. D.R. Horton-Tex., Ltd. v. Markel Int’l
Ins. Co., Ltd., 300 S.W.3d 740, 741 (Tex. 2009) (“We hold that the duty to indemnify is not
dependent on the duty to defend and that an insurer may have a duty to indemnify its
insured even if the duty to defend never arises.”).
55. McGinnes, 477 S.W.3d at 794 (quoting Trinity Universal Ins. Co v. Cowan, 945
S.W.2d 819, 824 (Tex. 1997)).
56. Id. at 793–94.
57. Id.
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The majority opinion drew a scathing dissent, authored by Justice
Boyd, which began as follows:
If you do not like your insurance policy, the Supreme Court of Texas
can now change it for you. Never mind all those times the Court has
said “we may neither rewrite the parties’ contract nor add to its lan-
guage.” Forget that we have repeatedly said “[i]f an insurance con-
tract uses unambiguous language, we will . . . enforce it as written.”
Ignore our former commitment to interpreting insurance policies by
relying on the “ordinary, everyday meaning of its words to the gen-
eral public.” Disregard our prior conviction that a contract’s lan-
guage is the best representation of what the parties mutually
intended. Those are just rules of construction, and we have only fol-
lowed them because they support freedom of contract, promote
transactional stability and predictability, and facilitate industry and
commerce. As it turns out, those objectives are now provisional, and
like a contract, the Court’s precedential opinions are just words on
paper, so you cannot assume we really meant what we chose to say.
At times, the Court’s members have characterized other members’
opinions as ignoring these rules while claiming to follow them. The
Court makes no such pretentions today. Instead, it flatly abandons
the rules and openly superimposes a meaning onto the term “suit”
that the Court concedes to be outside the term’s ordinary meaning,
unsupported by the context, and indisputably beyond what the con-
tracting parties actually contemplated. Today the Court demon-
strates that it can and will rewrite your insurance policy if it wants to.
We may look beyond the policy’s words to decide what we think you
must (or should) have meant. We will even make up our own defini-
tions so your words can mean something completely new. Why
would the Court do this, in spite of everything we’ve always said
about construing insurance policies? Because it seems like a good
thing to do here (and on top of that, everyone else is doing it). My
law professors (and my momma) taught me better. I respectfully
dissent.58
Interestingly, the majority candidly recognized that the EPA letters did
not fit within the ordinary meaning of the term suit.59 The supreme court
also recognized that the policies at issue were written prior to CER-
CLA.60 Thus, the insurer could not have contemplated the existence—
much less the scope—of such proceedings at the time of drafting the pol-
icy language.61 Accordingly, it appears that extending the meaning of
“suit” to such proceedings exceeds the scope of insurance actually con-
templated by the parties.62
58. Id. at 794–97 (Boyd, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
59. See id. at 797.
60. See id. at 800.
61. See id. at 801–02.
62. See id.
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3. Fifth Circuit Evaluates the Effect of Ambiguity in Policy Language
and Whether Sophisticated Insured Exception Exists to Rule
of Contra Proferentem
In Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Perraud, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit evaluated issues with respect to a possible
sophisticated insured exception to the long-standing doctrine of contra
proferentem.63 Underwriters issued a directors’ and officers’ liability pol-
icy to Stanford Financial Group Company (SFGC). SFGC employees
Bruce Perraud and Thomas Raffanello sought reimbursement of their at-
torneys’ fees and costs following successful defense to criminal charges.
The underwriters denied coverage based on an exclusion, prompting cov-
erage litigation in federal court. The district court found the exclusion
ambiguous and, after applying the doctrine of contra proferentem,64 held
that coverage applied under the policy. In doing so, the district court re-
fused to adopt a sophisticated-insured exception to that doctrine. On ap-
peal, the underwriters challenged only whether the sophisticated-insured
exception should apply.65
The Fifth Circuit recognized that courts around the country have taken
various approaches to the application and scope of this exception.66 Some
courts apply it only when “the insured actually negotiated the particular
provision at issue.”67 Other courts have adopted a broad exception, not-
ing that it applies if “the insured is a sophisticated business entity, regard-
less of whether the insured, or someone on the insured’s behalf, actually
negotiated or drafted portions of the policy.”68 Most courts, however, ap-
ply the exception only “where the insured—or a broker acting on the
insured’s behalf—actually negotiates, drafts, or proposes portions of the
policy.”69 The Fifth Circuit declined to opine whether Texas courts would
63. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Perraud, 623 F. App’x 628, 630 (5th
Cir. 2015).
64. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Willis, 296 F. 3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting
that if a policy is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, “Texas law re-
quires an insurance policy to be construed against the insurer and in favor of the
insured.”).
65. The underwriters did not challenge whether the exclusion was ambiguous. Moreo-
ver, the underwriters did not argue that Texas actually recognizes a sophisticated-insured
exception. Rather, the underwriters “assumed that the Supreme Court of Texas would an-
swer” this issue on certified question from the Fifth Circuit in In re Deepwater Horizon,
470 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. 2015). Perraud, 623 F. App’x at 631–32. The supreme court found it
unnecessary in that case to address this argument. The Fifth Circuit thus found that the
underwriters waived this issue on appeal. Id. at 632.
66. Id. at 630–31.
67. Id. at 630 (emphasis supplied) (citing Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins.
Co., 7 F.3d 1047, 1053 n.8 (1st Cir. 1993); McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of
London, 944 F.2d 1199, 1207 (5th Cir. 1991); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d
1253, 1265 n.9 (Cal. 1990); Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 681 F. Supp. 169, 174
(S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
68. Id. at 630–31 (citing Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 1257,
1261 (5th Cir. 1976); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Grand Chapter of Phi Sigma Kappa, Inc.,
651 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co. 650 A.2d
974, 991 (N.J. 1994)).
69. Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
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actually recognize any exception.70 Assuming, arguendo, that they would,
the Fifth Circuit evaluated whether Underwriters offered sufficient “evi-
dence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they have
satisfied that exception if it did exist.”71 The Fifth Circuit found that Un-
derwriters put forth insufficient evidence to warrant application of the
narrow or middle-ground approaches recognized by courts.72 The Fifth
Circuit also concluded that there was no reason to conclude that Texas
would adopt the broad application of the exception.73 Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit found that “[t]he district court did not err by declining to
apply the exception even if, arguendo, it were applicable in Texas.”74 Ap-
plying the well accepted doctrine of contra proferentum and observing
Texas’s strong policy in favor of finding coverage, the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed summary judgment for the insureds finding coverage under the
policy.75
4. Insurer not Required to Show Prejudice to Deny Coverage Based on
Late Notice Under Claims-Made-and-Reported Policy
In Prodigy Communications Corp. v Agricultural Excess & Surplus In-
surance Co., the Texas Supreme Court held that an insured’s breach of a
notice condition must result in a material breach of the policy for the
insurer to deny coverage.76 This ruling, however, was limited to the facts
of the case because the supreme court specifically recognized that while
late, the notice was provided by the insured during the extended report-
ing deadline.77 Thus, the insured’s delay was not a material breach be-
cause the insurer “was not denied the benefit of the claims-made nature
of its policy as it could not ‘close its books’ on the policy until . . . after the
discovery period expired.”78 Prodigy, when read in conjunction with PAJ,
Inc. v. Hanover Insurance Co.79 and Financial Industries Corp. v. XL Spe-
cialty Insurance Co.80 left open an inference that an insurer need not
show prejudice to deny coverage when an insured provides notice of a
claim under a claims-made policy after the policy period or other report-
70. Id. at 631–32 (declining to address this issue because the underwriters waived it on
appeal).
71. Id. at 632.
72. Id. at 633.
73. Id. at 632.
74. Id. at 633.
75. Id. at 632–33.
76. Prodigy Commc’ns Corp. v Agric. Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 288 S.W.3d 374, 375
(Tex. 2009).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 382.
79. 243 S.W.3d 630, 636–37 (Tex. 2008) (holding insurer must show prejudice before
denying coverage on late notice because notice provision is not an essential part of the
bargained-for exchange in an “occurrence” policy).
80. 285 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Tex. 2009) (holding insurer must show prejudice before deny-
ing coverage on late notice under claims-made policy when notice received during the pol-
icy period).
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ing deadline.81
The Dallas Court of Appeals addressed this issue recently in Nicholas
Petroleum, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co.82 In that case, the policies
at issue required the insured to provide notice of a claim “as soon as
practicable but in any event no later than thirty (30) days after the receipt
of the Claim by the Insured.”83 The initial policy period was from Sep-
tember 17, 2007 to September 17, 2008, and was renewed for the policy
period from September 17, 2008 to September 17, 2009.84
The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) notified the
insured on May 10, 2006, of alleged pollution from the insured’s tanks at
its facility.85 The TCEQ sent additional letters to the insured on August
23, 2006; July 12, 2007; September 12, 2007; February 5, 2008; and July 13,
2008. In August 2006, the owner of the building next to the insured’s
property retained counsel and sent a letter to the insured seeking dam-
ages resulting from the pollution. The building owner eventually filed suit
against the insured on August 4, 2008.
The insured argued that “it did not receive notice of a claim . . . until
the TCEQ sent a letter on February 5, 2009 stating it had become aware
that a release has occurred from a storage tank system [on the insured’s
property]” and that the insured was the responsible party.86 On April 10,
2009, the insured notified the insurer of the ongoing litigation with its
neighbor. The insured eventually settled and sought coverage from the
insurer, who denied based on late notice.
Though the insured conceded it failed to provide notice of the lawsuit
within the thirty day reporting provision of the 2008-2009 policy, the in-
sured argued that the insurer was required to show prejudice to deny
coverage because the insured had provided notice within the policy pe-
riod. The court of appeals noted that the notice provision at issue con-
tained additional restrictive language that notice be provided to the
insurer “no later than thirty (30) days after receipt of the Claim by the
Insured.”87 Based on the specificity of the policy language at issue, the
court of appeals concluded that the “notice provision is a material part of
the bargained-for exchange in this policy, and [the insured’s] failure to
comply with the notice provision was a material breach.”88 Because the
insured failed to provide notice within thirty days after receipt of the
claim, the court of appeals found that the policy did not provide coverage
81. See, e.g., Pennzoil-Quaker State Co. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 653 F.
Supp. 2d 690, 698 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (holding insurer not required to show prejudice by
insured’s failure to provide notice to insurer within extended reporting period of a claims-
made-and-report policy).
82. No. 05-13-01106-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7489, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas July
21, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
83. Id. at *3.
84. Id. at *1.
85. Id. at *3–4.
86. Id. at *10.
87. Id. at *14–15.
88. Id. at *15.
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for the settlement.89
5. Texas Supreme Court Recognizes Insurer May Have Contractual
Right of Reimbursement from Its Insured for Breach of a
Policy Requirement, Even in the Absence of a
Reimbursement Provision in the Policy
In Gotham Insurance Co. v. Warren E&P, Inc., the Texas Supreme
Court also addressed the scope of an insurer’s right to seek reimburse-
ment from its insured, specifically the “role of equity claims when a con-
tractual provision addresses the matter in dispute.”90 The insured sought
coverage for expenses incurred in regaining control of an oil well blow-
out. The insurer sued the insured under contract and equity theories for
reimbursement of amounts it had paid, alleging that the insured misrepre-
sented its ownership interest in the well. The supreme court relied on its
prior holding that “[w]here a valid contract prescribes particular remedies
or imposes particular obligations, equity generally must yield unless the
contract violates positive law or offends public policy.”91 The supreme
court determined that because the contractual provisions relied on by the
insurer did not violate the law or public policy, the insurer was limited to
contractual claims and could not proceed on its equity claims.92 Then ad-
dressing the contract claims, the supreme court emphasized that the ab-
sence of an express reimbursement clause in the policy “does not
necessarily foreclose an insurer’s ability to recover [from the insured] if
the insured has breached the policy,” and recognized that an insurer may
still pursue a claim against the insured to recover damages proximately
caused by the insured’s breach.93
B. DUTY TO DEFEND
1. Federal and State Courts Reach Conflicting Results Regarding
Whether an Exception to Eight-Corners Rule Exists
Liability insurance policies typically impose two separate and distinct
duties on an insurer: (1) the duty to defend; and (2) the duty to indem-
nify. To determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend, Texas courts
follow the “eight-corners” rule, so called because “only two documents
are ordinarily relevant to the determination . . . the policy and the plead-
ings of the third-party claimant.”94 The Texas Supreme Court has yet to
89. Id. at *15–16; see also Netspend Corp. v. Axis Ins. Co., No. A-13-CA-456-SS, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97656, at *21 (W.D. Tex. July 18, 2014), aff’d, 609 F. App’x 268 (5th Cir.
2015) (holding an insurer need not demonstrate prejudice because the insured did not pro-
vide notice in compliance with the reporting period requirement of the policy).
90. Gotham Ins. Co. v. Warren E&P, Inc., 455 S.W.3d 558, 559 (Tex. 2014).
91. Id. at 563 (quoting Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 648–49 (Tex. 2007)).
92. Id. at 563–66.
93. Id. at 566–67.
94. GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 308 (Tex.
2006) (citing King v. Dall. Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002)).
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officially recognize that any exception to the eight-corners rule exists.95
Federal courts have consistently recognized that an exception may exist
that would allow use of extrinsic evidence in certain circumstances to de-
termine the duty to defend. Their state court counterparts, however, have
been inconsistent and less willing to apply, much less even recognize, any
such exception. Litigation over this issue will likely continue until the
Texas Supreme Court provides additional guidance.
In Star-Tex Resources, L.L.C. v. Granite State Insurance Co., the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit again addressed this issue and held
that an insurer could rely on undisputed extrinsic evidence to establish
that it had no duty to defend.96 The underlying plaintiff’s complaint in-
cluded a brief factual statement regarding the incident at issue: “On or
about June 29, 2010, [underlying plaintiff] was seriously injured in an au-
tomobile collision caused by the negligence of Defendant Esquivel, an
employee of Star-Tex Resources. Defendant Esquivel was under the in-
fluence of alcohol and/or drugs at the time of the collision.”97 The insurer
denied coverage, arguing that an exclusion barred coverage for injury
arising out of the use of an auto owned or operated by any insured. Cov-
erage litigation ensued.
The insurer argued that it was reasonable to infer from the vague
pleading that an employee of the insured was operating a vehicle at the
time of the incident, meaning that there was no duty to defend based on
the exclusion.98 Alternatively, the insurer argued that extrinsic evidence
within the initial notice of the claim should be admissible in establishing
that there was no duty to defend based on the exclusion.99
The Fifth Circuit noted that the pleading supported multiple reasona-
ble inferences. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit found that it was not possi-
ble to determine from the pleadings alone whether a potentially covered
claim was alleged.100 The Fifth Circuit then evaluated whether to recog-
nize an exception to the eight-corners rule based on the two-part test
established in Northfield Insurance Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc.101
Based on the brief one-sentence description of the facts of the accident in
the underlying complaint, the Fifth Circuit found that the first part of the
test was met because it was impossible to determine whether coverage
was implicated.102 Although the auto exclusion was potentially implicated
95. See id. (“[T]his Court has never expressly recognized an exception to the eight-
corners rule.”).
96. Star-Tex Resources, L.L.C. v. Granite State Ins. Co., 553 F. App’x 366, 372–73 (5th
Cir. 2014).
97. Id. at 367.
98. Id. at 370.
99. The General Liability Notice of Occurrence/Claim provided to the insurer stated
that the insured’s employee “put car in motion pinning [the underlying plaintiff] between
t[w]o cars causing injury.” Id.
100. Id. at 370.
101. Id. at 371–73 (citing Northfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc., 363 F.3d 523,
531 (5th Cir. 2004)).
102. Id. at 372 (citing Northfield, 363 F.3d at 531).
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in the complaint’s description of the facts of the collision, the material
fact of whether the underlying defendant was driving the vehicle was
omitted.103 Second, the Fifth Circuit “consider[ed] whether ‘the extrinsic
evidence goes solely to a fundamental issue of coverage which does not
overlap with the merits of or engage the truth or falsity of any facts al-
leged in the underlying case.’”104 The Fifth Circuit found the extrinsic
evidence of whether the underlying defendant was operating the vehicle
applied only to the issue of coverage, and not to the negligence of the
underlying defendant or plaintiff.105 The Fifth Circuit additionally found
the extrinsic evidence also did not go to the truth or falsity of the underly-
ing complaint’s alleged facts, especially “given the paucity of facts con-
tained in [the underlying plaintiff’s] terse complaint.”106 Accordingly, the
Fifth Circuit determined that the insurer could rely on the extrinsic evi-
dence exception to the eight-corners rule to deny the duty to defend.107
In a subsequent opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
again analyzed this issue—this time where an insured sought to introduce
extrinsic evidence that would arguably trigger the duty to defend.108 In
Evanston Insurance Co. v. Lapolla Industries, Inc., the insured sought to
introduce evidence that the underlying injuries at issue resulted from the
mere presence of insulation, as opposed to the release of vapors from that
insulation during the installation process.109 The insured argued that if
the extrinsic evidence was allowed, the pollution exclusion was inapplica-
ble because the product itself caused the injuries as opposed to the vapors
emitting therefrom. The Fifth Circuit found that the detailed factual alle-
gations in the complaint established that the underlying plaintiff sought
damages resulting from vapors.110 As a result, the Fifth Circuit held that
the insured could not introduce extrinsic evidence “because it [was] not
impossible to discern whether coverage [was] potentially implicated.”111
During the Survey period, federal courts in the Northern District and
Southern District of Texas recognized that an exception to the eight-cor-
ners rule exists, but they refused to allow the use of extrinsic evidence in
evaluating the duty to defend because that evidence touched on the mer-
its of the underlying lawsuit.112 However, in Texas Farm Bureau Under-
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Northfield, 363 F.3d at 531).
105. Id. at 372–73.
106. Id. at 373.
107. Id.
108. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Lapolla Indus., Inc., No. 15-20213, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS
22552, at *1, *4 (5th Cir. Dec. 23, 2015). The Fifth Circuit’s analysis mirrors that of the
district court, which released its opinion on Feb. 23, 2015. See generally Evanston Ins. Co.
v. Lapolla Indus., 93 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
109. Evanston Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 22552, at *11.
110. Id. at *12.
111. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Selective Ins. Co. v. ICI Constr., Inc., No. G-14-110, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47000,
at *2–5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2015) (refusing to allow evidence that additional insured’s lia-
bility was caused by the named insured’s ongoing operations); Acadia Ins. Co. v. Jacob &
Martin, Ltd., No. 4:13-cv-798-O, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72901, at *9 (N.D. Tex. May 28,
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writers v. Graham, the Texarkana Court of Appeals113 flatly refused to
even recognize that an exception to the eight-corners rule exists.114 The
insured sought to introduce evidence that, in his opinion, demonstrated
that the shooting at issue in the underlying lawsuit was the result of an
accident thereby triggering the insurer’s duty to defend. The court of ap-
peals stated that “[r]eliance on this kind of extrinsic evidence violates the
eight corners rule.”115 The court of appeals then went further: “To date,
neither the Texas Supreme Court nor the Tyler Court of Appeals has offi-
cially embraced any exception to the eight corners rule, and our sister
courts have declined to apply the exception referenced in Pine Oak
Builders, Inc.”116 Despite the court of appeals’s refusal to even recognize
or evaluate whether an exception to the eight-corners rule exists, multiple
Texas state courts have recognized and applied an extrinsic evidence ex-
ception to determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend.117
2. Duty to Defend Not Triggered by Threatened Litigation
Although the duty to defend is broad, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas recently held that this duty is not implicated
by the threat of imminent litigation.118 In American Construction Benefits
Group, LLC v. Zurich American Insurance Co., the insured had a claims-
made policy covering it for losses caused by claims made for “wrongful
acts committed by [its] directors, officers, or employees.”119 The insured
settled a claim resulting from a purported wrongful act of its president,
and, in turn, sought coverage for the settlement from its insurer. Thereaf-
ter, members of the insured organization purportedly threatened to file a
derivative action against the insured’s directors relating to the settlement.
The insured filed a declaratory judgment, seeking to have the court deter-
mine whether the insurer has a duty to defend the insured against the
imminent derivative suit. Relying on the principles of the eight-corners
rule, the district court held that it could not decide on the duty to defend
2014) (refusing to allow extrinsic evidence that underlying plaintiff’s death potentially re-
sulted from covered cause as opposed to excluded cause alleged in pleading)).
113. Originally in the Tyler Court of Appeals, the case was transferred by the Texas
Supreme Court as part of its docket equalization efforts. Tex. Farm Bureau Underwriters v.
Graham, 450 S.W.3d 919, 921 n.1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. denied).
114. Id. at 925.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 394
S.W.3d 228, 235 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied); AccuFleet, Inc. v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 322 S.W.3d 264, 273 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)).
117. See, e.g., Weingarten Realty Mgmt. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 343 S.W.3d
859, 869 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Wade, 827 S.W.2d 448, 452–53 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied); Gonzales v.
Am. States Ins. Co. of Tex., 628 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1982, no writ);
Cook v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 418 S.W.2d 712, 715–16 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1967, no
writ); Int’l Serv. Ins. Co. v. Boll, 392 S.W.2d 158, 160–61 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1965,
writ ref’d n.r.e).
118. Am. Constr. Benefits Grp., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 3:12-CV-2726-D, 2014
WL 144974, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2014).
119. Id. at *1.
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issue because a necessary component (i.e., the pleading) to make such an
evaluation was missing.120
C. COMMERCIAL PROPERTY INSURANCE
1. Texas Supreme Court Holds Vacancy Clause Not Subject to Anti-
Technicality Statute or Prejudice Requirement
The Texas Supreme Court recently upheld the application of the va-
cancy clause within a homeowners’ policy as a basis for denial of cover-
age.121 In Greene v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, the homeowner/
insured moved from her home that was insured by Farmers Insurance
Exchange (Farmers) under the Texas Homeowners-A Policy (HOA) cov-
erage form. More than four months after the insured moved, her home
was damaged by fire. Farmers subsequently denied coverage for the loss,
citing a vacancy provision, which states: “If the insured moves from the
dwelling . . . the dwelling will be considered vacant. Coverage that applies
under Coverage A (Dwelling) will be suspended effective 60 days after
the dwelling becomes vacant. This coverage will remain suspended during
such vacancy.”122
The insured argued that § 862.054 of the Texas Insurance Code (the
Anti-Technicality Statute) and prior Texas Supreme Court case law pro-
hibited the insurer from relying on the vacancy condition because (1) the
vacancy did not cause or otherwise contribute to the loss; and (2) the
vacancy did not prejudice the insurer. The supreme court addressed the
insured’s arguments regarding the Anti-Technicality Statute first.123 That
statute provides as follows:
Unless the breach or violation contributed to cause the destruction
of the property, a breach or violation by the insured of a warranty,
condition, or provision of a fire insurance policy or contract of insur-
ance on personal property, or of an application for the policy or
contract:
(1) does not render the policy or contract void; and
(2) is not a defense to a suit for loss.124
The supreme court found that the Anti-Technicality Statute is applicable
only to a breach—that is, failure “to perform an act that [a party] has
contractually promised to perform.”125 The vacancy clause in the policy
contained no such “promise by or obligation on behalf of [the insured] to
occupy the house.”126 Rather, “[t]he vacancy clause [was] substantively
an agreement between the insured and [the insurer] that [the insurer] will
continue insuring the house for sixty days after it no longer is her resi-
120. Id. at *3.
121. Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 446 S.W.3d 761, 762–63 (Tex. 2014).
122. Id. at 763.
123. Id. at 764.
124. Id. at 764–65 (quoting TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. § 862.054 (West 2014)).
125. Id. at 765.
126. Id.
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dence.”127 Thus, the supreme court rejected the insured’s argument that
triggering the vacancy clause was the same as breaching a warranty, con-
dition, or provision as contemplated by the Anti-Technicality Statute.128
The supreme court also rejected the insured’s argument that the in-
surer was required to show prejudice.129 The analysis on this issue fo-
cused on the fact that because there was no breach of any condition (as
established by the discussion in the first portion of the opinion), prejudice
was not at issue.130 Finally, the supreme court rejected the insured’s argu-
ments that public policy precluded application of the vacancy condi-
tion.131 The vacancy clause could not be characterized as a mere
technicality under the Anti-Technicality Statute because it was contained
in a coverage form approved by the Texas Department of Insurance,
which has authority from the legislature to make decisions regarding
whether provisions violate public policy.132
2. Texas Supreme Court Holds that the Anti-Concurrent-Causation
Exclusion Bars Coverage for Loss That Resulted from Both
Covered and Excluded Causes of Loss
In JAW The Pointe, L.L.C. v. Lexington Insurance Co., the Texas Su-
preme Court considered for the first time the applicability of the anti-
concurrent-causation exclusion under Texas law.133 The insured owned an
apartment complex in Galveston that was damaged by Hurricane Ike.
During the rebuilding and adjusting process, the insured learned of a city
ordinance requiring any apartment that sustained damage at fifty percent
or more of its market value to be “brought into compliance with current
code requirements.”134 Because the ordinance applied to the properties,
the insured was required to demolish and rebuild the structures at sub-
stantial cost.
The policy provided coverage on an “all risk” basis.135 Moreover, it
contained an endorsement covering the increased cost of repairs or re-
placement as a result of an ordinance, but only if the policy covers the
property damage that triggers the enforcement of the ordinances. The
damage to the apartment complex was caused by a combination of wind
(which is covered) and flooding (which is specifically excluded). Never-
theless, an exclusion in the policy barred coverage for “loss or damage
caused directly or indirectly by any [excluded cause or event], regardless
of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any se-
127. Id.
128. Id. at 765–66.
129. Id. at 767.
130. Id. at 768.
131. Id. at 769–70 (distinguishing Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.
1984)).
132. Id. at 770.
133. JAW The Pointe, L.L.C. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 460 S.W.3d 597, 607 (Tex. 2015).
134. Id. at 600.
135. Id. at 604.
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quence to the loss.”136 Thus, the issue before the supreme court was
whether a covered loss caused the enforcement of the ordinance.137
The insurer argued that because the damages triggering the application
of the ordinance were caused by both wind and flood, the anti-concur-
rent-causation exclusion precluded coverage. The insured argued “that
because [the policy was] an all-risks policy” and a single covered cause of
loss occurred, “the burden shifted to [the insurer] to show the damage
that caused the enforcement of the ordinances was damage that the pol-
icy excluded.”138 The supreme court noted as follows:
Under these facts, and the contractual anti-concurrent-causation
clause, . . . the relevant inquiry is what in fact triggered enforcement
of the ordinances, not what in theory was sufficient to do so. Here,
[the insured] does not seek to recover losses caused by wind dam-
age—[the insurer] has already paid . . . for those losses—or losses
caused by flood damage—[the insured] concedes that the policy ex-
cludes coverage for those losses. Instead, [the insured] seeks to re-
cover losses caused by the city’s enforcement of the ordinances
against [the apartments]. The question, therefore, is what caused the
city to enforce the ordinances.139
The supreme court found “that the evidence conclusively establishe[d]
that . . . both wind and flood damage, in a sequence of events, . . . com-
bined to cause the city to enforce the ordinances.”140 Thus, because an
excluded cause of loss resulted in the application of the ordinances
against the property, the anti-concurrent-causation exclusion applied.141
In reaching this holding, the supreme court rejected the insured’s argu-
ment that application of the anti-concurrent-cause exclusion would con-
flict with the common law concurrent-cause doctrine previously
recognized by Texas courts.142 The supreme court stated that reliance on
the common law was inappropriate because the specific policy language
at issue in the policy before the supreme court was determinative.143
136. Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 606.
138. Id. at 606–07.
139. Id. at 608.
140. Id. at 609.
141. Id. at 610.
142. With respect to the common law concurrent-cause doctrine, the supreme court has
held the following:
[W]hen excluded and covered events combine to cause a loss and the two
causes cannot be separated, concurrent causation exists and the exclusion is
triggered such that the insurer has no duty to provide the requested cover-
age. But when a covered event and an excluded event each independently
cause the loss, separate and independent causation exists, and the insurer
must provide coverage despite the exclusion.
Id. at 608 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
143. Id.
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D. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COVERAGE
1. Texas Supreme Court Clarifies and Expands on Scope of Ruttiger
In 1988, the Texas Supreme Court extended the common law duty of
good faith and fair dealing to workers’ compensation insurers.144 In 2012,
however, the supreme court overruled its 1988 decision and held in Texas
Mutual Insurance Company v. Ruttiger that when the Texas Legislature
substantially amended the Workers’ Compensation Act in 1989, the legis-
lature sufficiently addressed the deficiencies that led to the creation of
the common law remedy.145 Specifically, the supreme court found that
because the legislature created detailed procedures and remedies in the
amended Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), there was no longer
“any need for a judicially imposed cause of action.”146 Rather, the Act
now provides the exclusive remedy in all workers’ compensation claims
and the sole recourse to challenge most insurer misconduct.147 Therefore,
the supreme court ruled that an injured employee may not sue a workers’
compensation carrier for common-law bad faith or for unfair settlement
and investigation practices under the Texas Insurance Code.148 Neverthe-
less, the supreme court recognized that its opinion did not bar all com-
mon law and statutory remedies available in the workers’ compensation
context.149
The Texas Supreme Court further explained the Ruttiger holding in In
re Crawford.150 Following an injury while working for his employer and
beginning the administrative process for receiving benefits, the employee
and his wife simultaneously filed suit against the workers’ compensation
carrier, alleging wrongful denial of benefits, misrepresentation of benefits
and coverage, “fail[ing] to provide required notices,” “repeatedly
agree[ing] to pay for benefits . . . but then refus[ing] to do so,” “per-
form[ing] inadequate and misleading investigations” into their claims,
and false accusations “leading to [a] wrongful arrest[ ]” for insurance
fraud.151 Although the employee and his wife acknowledged that the ad-
ministrative process provided the exclusive procedure for obtaining comp
benefits, they argued that “additional, independent, and ‘unrelated’ dam-
ages” could be tried in civil courts.152
The specific issue in Crawford not addressed in Ruttinger was “whether
the Division ha[d] exclusive jurisdiction over a claim for misrepresenta-
tion[s] . . . [in a] claims-settlement context.”153 The supreme court found
144. Aranda v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212–13 (Tex. 1988), overruled by
Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 451 (Tex. 2012).
145. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d at 447.
146. Id. at 451.
147. Id. at 451, 462.
148. Id. at 451.
149. Id. at 445–46.
150. 458 S.W.3d 920, 923–25 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam).
151. Id. at 921–22.
152. Id. at 922.
153. Id. at 927.
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that all claims at issue in Crawford should have been dismissed by the
trial court for lack of jurisdiction.154 The allegations based on deception,
fraud, and misrepresentation were without jurisdiction because the Work-
ers Compensation Act specifically prohibited carriers from making mis-
representations, including misrepresentations regarding the Act’s
provisions and reasons for not paying benefits.155 Similarly, the supreme
court determined that the “claims for negligence, gross negligence,
breach of contract, quantum meruit, breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing, and statutory violations” were all without jurisdiction be-
cause they arose “out of [the] investigation, handling, and settling of the”
claims by the employee and his wife.156 Moreover, the “claims for mali-
cious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress” were
without jurisdiction because they arose out of the carrier’s “investigation,
handling, and settling of the . . . claims for workers’ compensation bene-
fits.”157 Finally, the supreme court found that the argument by the em-
ployee’s wife that her claims were independent of the Act because she
was not an employee were without merit.158 Thus, the supreme court dis-
missed all the claims by the employee and his wife against the carrier
pending final resolution of the administrative adjudication.159
2. Availability of Lifetime Income Benefits Requires Actual Loss of
Use of Member of Body Itself
In Dallas National Insurance Co. v. De La Cruz, the Texas Supreme
Court considered whether an employee, who fell in 2004 and injured her
knee and back, was entitled to lifetime income benefits (LIBs).160 The
employee, who was a cook for the insured, underwent back and ar-
throscopic knee surgery but “continued to experience pain and numbness
in her legs.”161 In 2009, she filed a claim for LIBs on the basis that her
“2004 injury caused the total loss of use of both her feet at or above the
ankle, the loss of use was permanent, and she was entitled to LIBs pursu-
ant to [the Texas Labor Code.]”162 Thus, at issue was whether the worker
actually suffered “total loss of use of both feet at or above the ankle.”163
The supreme court noted that “[f]or total loss of use of a member to be
compensable,” there must be loss of use of the member itself “as opposed
to the loss of use resulting from injury to another part of the body.”164
Although there was “evidence that the injury to [the worker’s] back af-
fected her lower extremities, including her feet,” this evidence did not
154. See id. at 923, 929.
155. Id. at 926.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 927.
158. Id. at 928.
159. Id. at 928–29.
160. Dall. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. De La Cruz, 470 S.W.3d 56, 57 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 58 (citing TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.161(a)–(b) (West 2015)).
164. Id.
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foreclose the possibility that this condition resulted from “reflecting in-
jury to the nerve roots in [the worker’s] back.”165 Without further evi-
dence of actual damage or harm to the physical structure of the worker’s
back or feet and evidence that the injury caused the “permanent total loss
of use” of them, the supreme court held that the evidence was legally
insufficient to meet statutory requirements for LIBs.166 This decision,
combined with the supreme court’s previous holding from Insurance
Company of State of Pennsylvania v. Muro167 and language from the
Texas Labor Code, reinforce the intent that LIBs are available only when
there is total loss of use of a body member that results from injury to the
physical structure of the member itself.
3. Travelling to and from Work Considered to be in the Course and
Scope of Employment
In Seabright Insurance Co. v. Lopez, the Texas Supreme Court ex-
amined whether an employee was acting in the course and scope of his
employment while traveling to a job site.168 The employer had its primary
office in Odessa, Texas, but provided services and assigned the employee
to remote job sites, where he would usually stay in a motel and receive a
per diem for food and expenses.169 The employee was killed in an auto-
mobile accident while using a company provided vehicle and transporting
two of his co-workers to a work site more than 450 miles from his
home.170 The insurer denied coverage for death benefits, claiming the
employee was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time
of his death.171
The supreme court conceded that travel to and from work is not usu-
ally considered in the course and scope of employment, which requires
that an activity be related to or originate in the employer’s business and
occur in the furtherance of that business.172 The supreme court, however,
explained that an exception applied if “the relationship between the
travel and the employment is so close that it can fairly be said that the
injury had to do with and originated in the work, business, trade or pro-
fession of the employer.”173 The supreme court concluded that the evi-
dence demonstrated that the employee’s injury was so closely related to
his job that it had to do with and originated in his employer’s work.174
The supreme court noted that the employer’s business model called for
employing crews who would constantly shift from one remote assignment
165. Id. at 59.
166. Id.
167. 347 S.W.3d 268, 271–72 (Tex. 2011).
168. Seabright Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 465 S.W.3d 637, 639 (Tex. 2015).
169. Id. at 640.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 641 (citing Leordeanu v. Am. Prot. Ins. Co., 330 S.W.3d 239, 241 (Tex.
2010)).
173. Id. at 642 (citing Shelton v. Standard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. 1965)).
174. Id. at 644.
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to another.175 Moreover, the employer provided a per diem, hotel money,
a company vehicle, fuel, insurance, and expected co-workers to carpool;
and the travel to and from remote sites was both dictated by the em-
ployer and an essential part of the employment.176
4. Texas Supreme Court Addresses Allocation of Benefits Among
Multiple Beneficiaries
In State Office of Risk Management v. Carty, the Texas Supreme Court
answered the Fifth Circuit’s certified question regarding “[h]ow . . . a
workers’ compensation carrier’s right . . . to treat a recovery as an ad-
vance of future benefits [should] be calculated in a case involving multi-
ple beneficiaries.”177 A state worker died in a training accident;
afterward, the workers’ compensation carrier for state employees paid
medical, funeral, and death benefits to his wife and children.178 In addi-
tion to those benefits, the deceased’s wife filed suit in federal court
against two companies, Ringside, Inc. and Kim Pacific Martial Arts. Fol-
lowing settlement with the defendants, the workers’ comp carrier inter-
vened to assert its right to reimbursement.179
The trial court apportioned the settlement among the claimants into
four different categories, not as a collective group, but instead based on
the ratio of benefits they had already received.180 The carrier challenged
this allocation on the grounds that it misapplied the relevant section of
the Texas Labor Code governing carrier reimbursement from third-party
recoveries.181 Under the Texas statutory scheme, “amount[s] recovered
by a claimant in a third-party action shall be used to reimburse the insur-
ance carrier for benefits, including medical benefits, that have been
paid[.]”182 If there is money left over, that amount is “treated as an ad-
vance against future benefits, including medical benefits, that the claim-
ant is entitled to receive.”183 If there is not enough money to fully
compensate the claimants for all future benefits, the carrier “shall resume
the payment of benefits when the advance is exhausted.”184 The carrier
argued that multiple beneficiaries in a single settlement should be treated
as a single group for purposes of determining when the carrier’s obliga-
tions to resume benefit payments; when the total amount of suspended
benefits reached the total amount of money allocated as advance pay-
175. Id.
176. Id. The supreme court also found that because the employee was using transporta-
tion furnished by the employer, an exception to the statutory “course and scope” limita-
tions applied. Id. at 645 (citing TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.011(12)(A) (West 2015)).
177. State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Carty, 436 S.W.3d 298, 299–300 (Tex. 2014).
178. Id. at 300.
179. Id. at 300–01.
180. Id.
181. See id.; see also TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 417.002.
182. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 417.002(a).
183. Id. § 417.002(b).
184. Id. § 417.002(c).
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ments, the carrier would resume payments.185 The beneficiaries, on the
other hand, argued that the point at which benefit payments should re-
sume was best determined on a beneficiary-by-beneficiary basis.186
The supreme court sided with the carrier, noting that the beneficiaries’
interpretation would require treating the award of future benefits differ-
ently from the award of past benefits.187 The supreme court noted that
the legislature designed the statutory reimbursement scheme to give the
carrier “the first money a worker receives from a tortfeasor”; it went on
to point out that attempting to allocate future payments on a beneficiary-
by-beneficiary basis would only lead to further disputes over the proper
apportionment.188 Moreover, the statutory description of the carrier’s
subrogation interest did not distinguish between past or future interests,
and nothing in the language of the statute indicated that past and future
interests should be treated differently.189 Finally, apportionments like the
one imposed by the trial court “undermine[d] the goal of reducing carrier
costs.”190 Thus, “a workers’ compensation carriers right under section
417.002 to treat a third-party recovery as an advance of future benefits in
a case involving multiple beneficiaries of the same covered employee
should be determined on a collective-recovery basis.”191
E. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE
1. Courts Clarify the Scope and Application of Gilbert and the
Contractual Liability Exclusion
In 2010, the Texas Supreme Court issued its decision in Gilbert Texas
Construction, LP v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, in which it analyzed
the proper application of the contractual liability exclusion in commercial
general liability policies.192 Shortly thereafter, in Ewing Construction Co.,
Inc. v. Amerisure Insurance Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit certified questions to the Texas Supreme Court regarding the
scope and application of Gilbert.193 Since these decisions, the Fifth Circuit
has wrestled with the proper application of the contractual liability
exclusion.
In Gilbert, the insured was sued for damages sustained by a third
party’s building, which was adjacent to the insured’s work site.194 After
defeating all potential tort liability through summary judgment, the only
185. Carty, 436 S.W.3d at 302–03.
186. Id. at 302.
187. Id. at 303.
188. Id. at 303–04.
189. Id. The supreme court relied on the fact that both the section describing the pay-
ment of past benefits and the section describing the allocation of future benefits referred to
“the claimant.” Id.
190. Id. at 306.
191. Id. at 307.
192. Gilbert Tex. Constr., LP v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 327 S.W.3d 118, 121
(Tex. 2010).
193. Ewing Constr. Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 628, 633 (5th Cir. 2012).
194. Gilbert, 327 S.W.3d at 122.
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remaining theory of liability arose from the insured’s contract with
DART. Following settlement of the remaining claim, the insured “sought
indemnity from its insurers,” arguing a narrow reading should be given to
the exclusion and that “assumption” in the exclusion’s terms referred
only to the assumption of “liability of another such as in hold-harmless or
indemnity agreements.”195 The supreme court held that “assumption of
liability” means that the insured has assumed a liability for damages that
exceeds the liability it would have under general law.196 Therefore, the
contractual liability exclusion applies to exclude coverage for claims
where “the insured assumes liability for damages in a contract” that it
would not have otherwise had under the law.197 The supreme court deter-
mined that the insured had assumed liability for damage to property of a
third party that it would not have had under general law and that the only
relevant exception, “the exception for liability the insured would have [in
the] absen[ce] [of a] contract,” did not apply.198 Accordingly, it held that
the contractual liability exclusion barred coverage for the insured’s
claim.199
In Ewing, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struggled to
apply Gilbert.200 The Fifth Circuit originally determined that the contrac-
tual liability exclusion applied when an insured entered into a contract,
and, by doing so, has assumed liability for its own performance under that
contract.201 But less than two months after issuing its original opinion, the
Fifth Circuit withdrew its opinion and certified the following question202
to the Texas Supreme Court:
1.  Does a general contractor that enters into a contract in which it
agrees to perform its construction work in a good and workmanlike
manner, without more specific provisions enlarging this obligation,
“assume liability” for damages arising out of the contractor’s defec-
tive work so as to trigger the Contractual Liability Exclusion.203
The facts were relatively straight forward: a school district sued the in-
sured and sought damages for allegedly defective construction of a tennis
court.204 The school district alleged that the insured failed to (1) “prop-
erly prepare for and manage . . . construction”; (2) “retain and oversee
subcontractors”; (3) “perform in a good and workmanlike manner”; (4)
complete construction in accordance with the contract terms and specifi-
195. Id. at 121, 125 (emphasis in original).
196. Id. at 127.
197. Id. at 128, 131–32.
198. Id. at 123, 133–36.
199. Id. at 131–32.
200. Ewing Constr. Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 628, 632 (5th Cir. 2012).
201. Ewing Constr. Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 684 F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir. 2012),
withdrawn by 690 F.3d 628 (2012).
202. The Fifth Circuit certified two questions. The supreme court, however, did not
address the second question because it answered the first “no.” Ewing Constr. Co., Inc. v.
Amerinsure Ins. Co., 420 S.W.3d 30, 31 (Tex. 2014).
203. Id. at 31.
204. Id.
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cations; and (5) “use ordinary care in the performance of its contract,”
proximately causing damages to Plaintiff.205
Quoting Gilbert, the insurer first contended that the contractual liabil-
ity exclusion “means what it says: it excludes claims when the insured
assumes liability for damages in a contract or agreement, except when the
insured would be liable absent the contract or agreement.”206 It then ar-
gued that the exclusion applied because the insured contractually as-
sumed liability for damages arising from its failure to construct the tennis
courts in a good and workmanlike manner.207 The insured argued that,
pursuant to Gilbert, the contractual liability exclusion is triggered only
when the liability assumed under contract “enlarge[s] its obligations be-
yond any general common-law duty it might have.”208 The supreme court
agreed with the insured and concluded:
[A] general contractor who agrees to perform its construction work
in a good and workmanlike manner, without more, does not enlarge
its duty to exercise ordinary care in fulfilling its contract, thus it does
not ‘assume liability’ for damages arising out of its defective work so
as to trigger the Contractual Liability Exclusion.209
Therefore, it answered the certified question “no.”210
The same year the Texas Supreme Court answered Ewing, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was once again faced with deter-
mining the scope of the contractual liability exclusion. In Crownover v.
Mid-Continent Casualty Co.,211 the insured entered into a construction
contract to build a home for the Crownovers.212 The contract included a
warranty-to-repair clause that required the insured to promptly correct
work that did not conform to the requirements of the contract. After the
work was completed, the Crownovers noticed various defects. When the
insured refused to correct the deficiencies, the Crownovers initiated arbi-
tration. The arbitrator determined that that the insured was liable for
breach of the construction contract’s warranty-to-repair clause.213 The
Crownovers demanded that the insurer pay the arbitration award, but the
insurer denied coverage.214
The Fifth Circuit initially found that the insured’s obligation to perform
its work in a workmanlike manner was based solely on the construction
contract.215 The Crownovers petitioned for rehearing because that ruling
conflicted with Gilbert and Ewing. On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit first
205. Id. at 33–34.
206. Id. at 36.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 68.
210. Id.
211. 772 F. 3d 197 (5th Cir. 2014).
212. Id. at 199.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Crownover v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 757 F. 3d 200, 208 (5th Cir. 2014), with-
drawn by 772 F.3d 197 (2014).
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determined that the insured’s defective work was an occurrence under
the policy that caused property damage to the Crownovers’ HVAC sys-
tem and the foundation.216 The Fifth Circuit then explained that to trig-
ger the contractual liability exclusion, the insurer was required to show
that “the source of the adjudicated liability—the express duty to repair—
expanded [the insured’s] obligations” under common law.217 In determin-
ing whether the insurer had met its burden, the Fifth Circuit identified
three elements in the construction contract that “could potentially have
triggered the contractual-liability exclusion: (1) it constituted an express
rather than implied warranty; (2) it was a duty to repair rather than con-
struct; (3) it referred to performance in conformity with the contract doc-
uments rather than simple competent performance.”218 The Fifth Circuit
determined that none of these factors “extended [the insured’s] liability
beyond its liability under general law” because there is a general law duty
to perform the terms of a contract with reasonable care and to repair
work that is not performed work in a good and workmanlike manner.219
Because the insured’s “adjudicated liability reflected a duty no broader
than that required by general law,” the Fifth Circuit held that contractual
liability exclusion did not apply.220 The Fifth Circuit rendered summary
judgment in favor of the Crownovers and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for calculation of attorneys’ fees.221
2. Fifth Circuit Analyzes Scope of “Advertisement” and “Advertising
Injury” Under Coverage B
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently applied a
broad interpretation of the term “advertisement” as used in the context
of general liability policy. In Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Kipp Flores
Architects, LLC, the underlying-plaintiff architectural firm Kipp Flores
Architects, LLC (KFA) licensed eleven distinct home designs to the in-
sured.222 Under the license agreement, the insured was authorized to
build one home per design for a total of eleven homes. If the insured
desired to build additional homes using a licensed design, it was required
to compensate KFA in advance for the use of that design. The insured
built the original eleven houses, but then built hundreds of other houses
using the same design plans without paying additional licensing fees. KFA
sued and obtained a large judgment against the insured for copyright
infringement.223
216. Crownover, 772 F. 3d at 206–07.
217. Id. at 207.
218. Id. (emphasis in original).
219. Id. at 207–08.
220. Id. at 209–10.
221. Id. at 213.
222. Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Kipp Flores Architects, LLC, 602 F. App’x 985, 987 (5th
Cir. 2015).
223. Id. at 988.
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The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing “that the . . .
judgment [against the insured] was not for a covered ‘advertising injury’
because the infringement did not take place in an ‘advertisement’ as de-
fined in the policies.”224 The policies at issue provide coverage for dam-
ages because of “personal and advertising injury,” which is defined, in
part, as “injury . . . arising out of . . . infringing upon another’s copyright
. . . in [the insured’s] ‘advertisement.’”225 Advertisement is defined as “a
notice that is broadcast or published to the general public or specific mar-
ket segments about [the insured’s] goods, products or services for the
purpose of attracting customers or supporters.”226
According to the insurer, an infringing house cannot—under the lan-
guage of the policy and common sense—be “notice” that is “broadcast or
published,” and therefore the house itself can never be an advertise-
ment.227 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, noting initially that the
policy does not restrict that notice must be in a particular form.228
Rather, prior case law has construed “notice” broadly, finding that “pub-
lish” is a comprehensive term meaning “‘to make public or generally
known’ or ‘to make generally accessible or available for acceptance or
use . . . [or] to present to or before the public.’”229 Moreover, the term
“advertisement” has an expansive definition under Texas law, with the
Texas Supreme Court finding that an “advertising” is a “‘marketing de-
vice[ ] designed to induce the public to patronize’ a particular establish-
ment.”230 Because the undisputed facts demonstrated that the insured’s
“primary means of marketing” consisted of the use of the homes them-
selves, both through the use of model homes and yard signs on the vari-
ous properties, the Fifth Circuit found that infringing houses were
advertisements under the terms of the policies.231
F. EXCESS COVERAGE
In a recent decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that an insured could not trigger an excess policy by making a “fill
the gap” payment to exhaust a primary policy after the primary insurer
made settlement payments that did not exceed the primary policy lim-
its.232 The insured obtained an excess insurance policy from AXIS Insur-
ance Company (AXIS), which stated that AXIS had no obligation to
provide coverage until “after all applicable Underlying Insurance . . . has
been exhausted by actual payment under such Underlying Insurance.”233
After settling a lawsuit, the insured sued its three insurers, alleging it was
224. Id.
225. Id. at 990.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 992–93.
228. Id. at 993.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 993–94 (quoting Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 614–15 (Tex. 1980)).
231. Id. at 994.
232. Martin Res. Mgmt. Corp. v. AXIS Ins. Co., 803 F.3d 766, 773 (5th Cir. 2015).
233. Id. at 769.
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entitled to coverage under a primary policy issued by Zurich American
Insurance Company (Zurich) and two excess policies (including the first
excess AXIS policy), with each policy having a $10 million limit.234
The insured eventually settled with Zurich for $6 million. Thereafter,
AXIS moved for summary judgment, arguing the primary policy was not
exhausted because the primary insurer had not paid its full policy lim-
its.235 The insured argued that the AXIS policy allows the insured to “fill
the gap” by paying the difference between the limit of the primary insur-
ance and the below-limit settlement, thereby triggering the AXIS pol-
icy.236 The Fifth Circuit held that “the AXIS policy unambiguously
precludes exhaustion by below-limit settlement,” noting that the language
of the AXIS policy makes it clear that exhaustion requires “actual pay-
ment under [the Zurich Policy]” of its entire $10 million limit.237 The
Fifth Circuit also found that the AXIS policy prohibited the insured from
“paying the difference between the underlying limit of liability and the
below-limit settlement,” including the “Reduction or Exhaustion of Un-
derlying Limits” and “Limits of Liability” provisions.238 Moreover, the
Fifth Circuit held that even if the primary insurer’s below-limit settlement
constituted an actual payment, Martin’s argument that its own gap pay-
ments also were “actual payments under [the primary policy]” was not
reasonable.239
The Eastland Court of Appeals in Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. High-
lands Insurance Co. reached a different conclusion, relying on the specific
policy language at issue.240 The underlying dispute arose out of a $12 mil-
lion remediation undertaken by the insured as required by North Caro-
lina pollution control laws. The insured had four layers of liability policies
to cover such losses, with the “special risk policy” issued by Highlands
Insurance Company (Highlands) attaching at $8 million.241 The insured
sued the three underlying insurers in Georgia state court (the insured did
not initially sue Highlands), which ultimately resulted in a settlement in
which the underlying insurers settled for less than their respective policy
limits. The insured “paid the remaining balance of the loss.”242 Thereaf-
ter, the insured notified Highlands that the total losses exceeded $8 mil-
lion and demanded that it indemnify it for the excess of that amount.243
Highlands responded to the demand arguing that its policy was not impli-
234. Id. at 767. The second excess policy, issued by Arch Insurance Company, was not
at issue on appeal.
235. Id. at 768.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 769–70.
238. Id. at 772–73.
239. Id. at 770.
240. Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 444 S.W.3d 307, 309, 311 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2014, pet. denied).
241. Id. at 310.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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cated because the underlying limits were not fully exhausted. Coverage
litigation ensued.
The court of appeals held that the Highlands policy attached based on
its terms despite the fact that the underlying settlements were for
amounts less than full policy limits.244 The court of appeals initially ex-
plained that the Highlands policy directed it to look to an underlying um-
brella policy for the definition of “ultimate net loss.”245 Then, the court of
appeals integrated into the “Exhaustion Clause” of the Highlands policy
that definition of “ultimate net loss.”246 The result, according to the court
of appeals, was the following “Limit of Liability” provision in the High-
lands policy:
It is expressly agreed that liability shall attach to [Highlands] only
after the Underlying Umbrella Insurers have paid or have been held
liable to pay the full amount of all sums which the insured or any
organization as his insurer, or both, become legally obligated to pay
as damages, whether by reason of adjudication or settlement, because
of personal injury, property damage or advertising liability.247
Based on what it determined to be specific unambiguous language at is-
sue permitted exhaustion via payments by the insured or the underlying
insurers, meaning that the Highlands policy attached at $8 million.248
IV. DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. DISCOVERY FOR INSURER’S CLAIM FILES FOR ITS OTHER
INSUREDS WAS OVERBROAD
In In re National Lloyds Insurance Co., the Texas Supreme Court en-
ded the uncertainty regarding whether discovery of other policyholders’
claim file is permissible by holding that such discovery will almost always
be considered overbroad.249 The insured’s home in Cedar Hill, Texas was
damaged by two hail storms—one in September 2011 and another in June
2012. The trial court ordered the insurer to produce all claim file materi-
als for all claims adjusted by the two adjusting firms that adjusted the
insured’s claims, but only for claims for properties in Cedar Hill that
arose from those particular storms.250 On mandamus review, the supreme
court agreed with the insurer that the requested discovery was necessarily
overbroad and stated, “[W]e fail to see how National Lloyds’ overpay-
ment, underpayment, or proper payment of the claims of unrelated third
parties is probative of its conduct with respect to Plaintiff’s undervalua-
tion claims at issue in this case.”251 The supreme court further opined,
244. Id. at 312.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 313 (emphasis added by court).
248. Id.
249. In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 449 S.W.3d 486, 489 n.2 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam).
250. Id. at 487.
251. Id. at 489–90.
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“scouring claim files in the hopes of finding similarly situated claimants
whose claims were evaluated differently from [those of the insured] is at
best an impermissible fishing expedition.”252 The supreme court there-
fore directed the trial court to vacate its discovery order.253
B. PROPER PARTIES TO COVERAGE LITIGATION
1. An Underlying Claimant Appears to Be a Proper Party to a
Declaratory Judgment Action by an Insurer
In bringing a declaratory judgment action, an insurer must evaluate
whether the underlying claimant is a proper or necessary party to the
litigation. With respect to declaratory judgments in federal court brought
pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, case law is (rela-
tively) clear that a third-party claimant is a proper party to the declara-
tory judgment action.254 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Texas recently examined this issue again in Vanliner Insurance Co.v.
Dermargosian.255 The underlying tort action in Dermargosian involved
claims against the insured for negligently packing a firearm in the under-
lying plaintiff’s moving boxes, which resulted in the underlying plaintiff
being charged with a crime in Dubai. After the insured sought coverage,
the insurer commenced coverage litigation in federal court against both
the insured and the underlying plaintiff.256 The underlying plaintiffs
moved to dismiss the action under various legal and procedural theories,
arguing that “there [was] no actual controversy between the parties.”257
In particular, the underlying plaintiffs argued that there was no contrac-
tual privity with the insurer, that the insurer did not sell them a policy,
and that the insurer did not appear to be making claims against them in
the declaratory judgment action. Noting that “[a] declaratory judgment
action among an insurer, an insured, and a plaintiff in a pending lawsuit
against the insured constitutes a ‘controversy’ within the meaning of the
[federal court declaratory judgment action statute] and Article III of the
Constitution,” the district court held that the underlying claimants failed
to establish that the suit should be dismissed.258 The district court also
specifically noted that an individual injured by an insured party is consid-
ered a third-party beneficiary of the liability insurance policy; thus, the
252. Id. at 489.
253. Id. at 490.
254. See Century Sur. Co. v. Hardscape Constr. Specialties, No. 4:05-CV-285-Y, 2006
WL 1948063, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 13, 2006) (“This court’s determination that [the insurer]
does not have a duty to indemnify [its insureds] is binding on [the injured party], as well,
due to the derivative nature of its right to recovery.”); Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. Breaux, 368 F.
Supp. 2d 604, 621 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (“[U]nder Texas law, a declaratory judgment action
brought by an insurer is binding upon a third-party beneficiary to a liability insurance pol-
icy if properly joined as a party to such action.”); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Garcia, 223
F.R.D. 308, 311 (N.D. Tex. 2004); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cooper Mach. Corp., 817 F. Supp.
45, 46–47 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
255. No. 3:12-CV-5074-D, 2014 WL 113595, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2014).
256. Id. at *1.
257. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), (6)).
258. Id. at *2, *4.
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declaratory judgment action is binding against a properly joined third-
party beneficiary.259
With respect to declaratory judgments brought in state court pursuant
to the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act in the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, the law remains unsettled. Some Texas state courts have
held that the underlying claimant is not a proper party on the basis that
no justiciable controversy exists between it and the insurer.260 These
courts based their analysis on a 1968 opinion issued by the Texas Su-
preme Court, Fireman’s Insurance Company of Newark, N.J. v. Burch, in
which the supreme court found that the duty to indemnify was not justici-
able until a final judgment was rendered against the insured.261 Despite
Burch, the Texas Supreme Court held in its 1983 decision, Dairyland
County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Childress, that if the underlying plaintiff
is not a party to coverage litigation, the underlying plaintiff is free to re-
litigate issues regarding potential indemnity.262 Thus, if the insurer did
not include the underlying claimant (which courts had concluded was
proper due to lack of a justiciable controversy), any adjudication in the
declaratory judgment action was potentially inapplicable to the underly-
ing claimant.
After the above cases were decided, the Texas Supreme Court issued
an opinion in which it held that “duty to indemnify is justiciable” in cer-
tain circumstances prior to the time that a judgment is rendered in an
underlying tort suit.263 In Griffin, the Texas Supreme Court specifically
stated that after Burch, the Texas Constitution was amended to give dis-
trict court’s broader jurisdiction, which includes jurisdiction over “all ac-
tions, proceedings, and remedies.”264
2. Texas Supreme Court Reaffirms Texas is a no “Direct-Action” State
While an underlying claimant appears to be a proper party to a declara-
tory judgment action by an insurer, “an injured party cannot sue the
tortfeasor’s insurer directly until the tortfeasor’s liability has been finally
determined by agreement or judgment.”265 The Texas Supreme Court re-
cently reaffirmed that Texas remains a “no direct action” state in In re
Essex Insurance Co.266 In that case, the underlying claimant argued that it
could pursue the insured’s insurer because its direct action was for declar-
259. Id. at *3
260. See Safeway Managing Gen. Agency for State & Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Cooper, 952 S.W.2d 861, 868–69 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, no writ); Providence Lloyds
v. Blevins, 741 S.W.2d 604, 606–07 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ); Nat’l Sav. Ins. Co. v.
Gaskins, 572 S.W.2d 573, 574–76 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
261. Fireman’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 332–33 (Tex. 1968),
superseded by constitutional amendment, TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8, as recognized in Farmers
Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1997).
262. Dairyland Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Childress, 650 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tex. 1983).
263. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d at 84.
264. Id. (quoting TEX. CONST. art V, § 8).
265. See Angus Chem. Co. v IMC Fertilizer, Inc. 939 S.W.2d 138, 138 (Tex. 1997) (per
curiam).
266. 450 S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex. 2014).
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atory judgment and not money damages. The supreme court summarily
rejected this argument, stating, “Whether stated as claims for damages or
for declaratory relief, [third-party beneficiaries] claims against [insurer]
must fail.”267 The supreme court first pointed out that the insurer would
be faced with a conflict of interest if, in the same suit, it must both estab-
lish it has no duty to defend in addition to providing a vigorous defense to
the insured.268 Second, the supreme court surmised evidence of liability
insurance would be admitted in a combined suit in violation of Rule 411
of the Texas Rules of Evidence.269 Accordingly, because both of these
policy reasons apply both to a “plaintiff . . . seeking declaratory relief or
money damages from the insurer,” the supreme court rejected the argu-
ments that the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act provides a basis to avoid
the no direct action rule.270
3. Fifth Circuit Allows Direct Action against Insurer Based on
Compulsory Counterclaim Rule of Civil Procedure
Despite the no direct-action rule, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit recently allowed an underlying claimant to sue the insured’s
insurer directly.271 In National Liability and Fire Insurance Co. v. R&R
Marine, Inc., the underlying tort action involved a bailment between the
underlying claimant (bailee) and the insured (bailor) for the repair of two
of the claimant’s vessels. While one of the vessels was in the custody of
the insured, it sank as a result of taking on water during a tropical storm.
Thereafter, the insurer initiated a declaratory action, which resulted in
the counterclaim by the claimant against the insurer arguing that it must
cover all claims and damages the claimant had against its insured.272 Re-
lying on the no direct action rule, the insurer argued that a final judgment
had not been entered against insured and therefore the predicate to the
insurer’s liability had not been met.273 The claimant argued that it was
required to assert its compulsory counterclaim against the insurer by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.274
Following, an Erie analysis, the Fifth Circuit determined that the princi-
ples of no direct action and compulsory counterclaims are in direct con-
flict.275 The Fifth Circuit found that the counterclaim was compulsory
under Rule 13(a) because it and the insurer’s declaratory action arose out
of the same occurrence.276 Further, the Fifth Circuit aptly noted that be-
cause the insurer joined both the insured and the claimant in the initial
267. Id. at 526.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 526–27.
270. Id. at 527.
271. Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. R&R Marine, Inc., 756 F.3d 825, 834–35 (5th Cir.
2014).
272. Id. at 828.
273. Id. at 833.
274. Id. at 834.
275. Id. at 835.
276. Id.
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declaratory action, no additional parties were necessary to join.277 Finally,
the Fifth Circuit, in finding that a direct conflict between the state and
federal laws exists, was required to determine whether application of the
federal procedural rule would violate either the U.S. Constitution or the
Rules Enabling Act.278 The Fifth Circuit found that application of Rule
13(a) did not violate any constitutional rights, nor was the Rules Enabling
Act violated because the underlying claimant’s “counterclaim [did] not
‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right’ under Texas law.”279
Citing Hanna v. Plumer, the Fifth Circuit concluded its discussion by not-
ing the goal of uniformity in federal courts and their efficient administra-
tion of legal proceedings.280 Following the principles established by
Hanna, the Fifth Circuit determined that it could resolve the lawsuit in a
single action by combining all potential disputes between the parties.281
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the underlying claimant “had
standing to bring its counterclaim” against the insured under Rule
13(a).282
Although R&R Marine appears to be limited to the specific facts and
circumstances presented by that particular case, we suspect that claimants
will rely on that holding to make arguments based on procedural rules or
res judicata principles in their attempts to sue the tortfeasor’s insurers
directly. In light of the holding from In re Essex, however, it seems clear
that Texas will remain a no direct action state until the legislature takes
action to change this approach.
4. Federal Courts Address Arguments Related to Improper Joinder in
Evaluating Jurisdiction for Coverage Litigation
Frequently an initial subject of coverage litigation is whether a non-
diverse defendant is improperly joined in an attempt to defeat federal
court jurisdiction. According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, the doctrine of improper joinder represents “a ‘narrow exception’
to the rule of complete diversity, and the burden of persuasion on the
party claiming improper joinder is a ‘heavy one.’”283 Federal courts pre-
fer for state court jurisdiction in these matters, noting that “doubts re-
garding whether removal jurisdiction is proper should be resolved against
federal jurisdiction.”284 Additionally, “the Court must resolve all ambigu-
ities of state law in favor of the non-removing party.”285 With these stan-
dards in mind, courts analyze improper joinder claims under the two
potential circumstances. First, improper joinder may be established by the
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012)).
280. Id. at 835–36 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Campbell v. Stone Ins., Inc., 509 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing McDonal v.
Abbott Labs., 408 F.3d 177, 183 (5th Cir. 2005)).
284. Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000).
285. Campbell, 509 F.3d at 669.
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removing party through a showing of “(1) actual fraud in the pleading of
jurisdictional facts, or (2) [the] inability of the plaintiff to establish a
cause of action against the non-diverse defendant in state court.”286 A
majority of cases turn on the second basis for showing improper joinder,
which can be stated differently in that “there is no reasonable basis for
the district court to predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover
against an in-state defendant.”287 Several federal district courts call this
inquiry a “Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis” in that the defendant must show
that the plaintiff has no possibility of recovery.288 This standard often re-
quires courts to enter into a fact-intensive inquiry considering the plain-
tiff’s complaint in light of relevant state law. As a result, during this
Survey period, various courts found that joinder was proper when the
plaintiff established a valid cause of action against a non-diverse defen-
dant,289 whereas other courts found joinder improper where the plaintiff
was unable to articulate a valid cause of action against the non-diverse
defendant.290
C. THE “FULLY ADVERSARIAL TRIAL” REQUIREMENT
Texas courts continue to address the scope of State Farm Fire and Cas-
ualty Co. v. Gandy, which involved issues of whether an insurer is bound
by an insured’s settlement and assignment.291 In Gandy, the Texas Su-
preme Court held:
a defendant’s assignment of his claims against his insurer to a plain-
tiff is invalid if (1) it is made prior to an adjudication of plaintiff’s
claim against defendant in a fully adversarial trial, (2) defendant’s
insurer has tendered a defense, and (3) either (a) defendant’s insurer
has accepted coverage, or (b) defendant’s insurer has made a good
faith effort to adjudicate coverage issues prior to the adjudication of
plaintiff’s claim. We do not address whether an assignment is also
invalid if one or more of these elements is lacking. In no event, how-
ever, is a judgment for plaintiff against defendant, rendered without
286. McKee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 358 F.3d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 2004).
287. Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004).
288. Id.
289. Celanese Corp. v. OneBeacon Am. Ins., Co., No. 3:14-CV-3981-L, 2015 WL
3939399, at *8 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2015); Linron Props. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co.,
No. 3:15-CV-00293-B, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77357, at *12 (N.D. Tex. June 16, 2015); W.
Ohio St. Condo Ass’n v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 2:15-CV-192, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77522,
at *8 (S.D. Tex. June 16, 2015); Garza v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 2:15-CV-149, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77525, at *13 (S.D. Tex. June 16, 2015); Garza v. Geovera Specialty Ins. Co.,
No. 7:13-CV-525, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1975, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2014); Rocha v.
Geovera Specialty Ins. Co., No. 7:13-CV-589, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1990, at *15 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 8, 2014).
290. Michels v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ind., 544 F. App’x 535, 539–40 (5th Cir. 2013); Cal-
vary United Pentecostal Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., No. 4:15-CV-365, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 122192, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2015); Davis v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 3:15-CV-
0596-B, 2015 WL 4475860, at *6–7 (N.D. Tex. July 21, 2015); Mainali Corp. v. Covington
Specialty Ins. Co., No. 3:15-CV-1087-D, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115191, at *6 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 31, 2015); Struder v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 4:13CV413, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
183915, at *4–5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2013).
291. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1996).
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a fully adversarial trial, binding on defendant’s insurer or admissible
as evidence of damages in an action against defendant’s insurer by
plaintiff as defendant’s assignee.292
Two Texas state appellate courts addressed the “fully adversarial trial”
issue identified in Gandy during the Survey period, reaching differing re-
sults. In Vela v. Catlin Specialty Insurance Co., the insured, a construction
contractor, sued the general contractor for breach of contract, alleging he
was owed money for work he performed.293 The general contractor coun-
terclaimed for breach of contract and negligence, asserting that the in-
sured’s work was “junk,” requiring demolition and rebuilding at a cost of
$100,000. The insurer initially denied coverage, but later “agreed to de-
fend . . . under a reservation of rights.”294 The insured rejected this de-
fense and proceeded with personal counsel. The insured and general
contractor eventually agreed to waive their rights to a jury trial, that the
insured would non-suit his claims, and that any sums adjudicated in sub-
sequent litigation against the insurer would be divided between them.295
At the bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the gen-
eral contractor of $312,204 plus $122,500 in attorneys’ fees.296 Thereafter,
the insured filed suit against the insurer.
After finding that various “business risk” exclusions in the policy pre-
cluded the duty to defend, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals then eval-
uated whether the insurer had a duty to indemnify the insured for the
unpaid judgment.297 According to the court of appeals, the parties’ agree-
ment, subsequent bench trial, minimal participation by the insured’s
counsel during the bench trial, and the insured’s denial that he knew the
proceeding took place298 amounted to a “‘sham of adversity’ to the trial
court and distorted the trial process.”299 The court of appeals concluded
that the agreement tended to promote additional litigation, as opposed to
providing a means to end the litigation, which is a practice expressly dis-
approved by the Texas Supreme Court for public policy reasons.300 Thus,
the court of appeals found that there was no “fully adversarial trial,” that
the insurer was not bound by the judgment, and that it owed no duty to
indemnify the insured.301
292. Id. at 714.
293. Vela v. Catlin Specialty Ins. Co., No. 13-13-00475-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3743,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Apr. 16, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
294. Id. at *5.
295. Id. at *7.
296. Id. at *9–10.
297. Id. at *19.
298. During his deposition, the insured stated that he did not believe or did not under-
stand that a judgment was entered against him. He also testified that he had no knowledge
of the bench trial and believed that he was still pursuing the general contractor for dam-
ages. Id. at *26–27.
299. Id. at *30. The court of appeals also found that the exclusions applicable to the
duty to defend also barred indemnity coverage. Id. at *20.
300. Id. at *30.
301. See id. at *30 n.10; see also Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Villalta, 558 F. App’x 404, 405 (5th
Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (holding an assignment by insured to underling plaintiffs was inva-
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On the other hand, in Great American Insurance Co. v. Hamel, the El
Paso Court of Appeals found a valid assignment that resulted from what
it determined to be a fully adversarial trial.302 The insured was sued for
allegedly failing to construct a home “in a good and workmanlike man-
ner.”303 The insurer refused to defend. Thereafter, the underlying parties
entered into various agreements and stipulations relating to the claims at
issue before trying the case to the bench. Both sides introduced extensive
testimony during the trial regarding the work and damages at issue. Fol-
lowing entry of judgment against the insured, the insured assigned its
claims against the insurer to the underlying plaintiffs, who filed suit
against the insurer “for breach of contract, declaratory relief, and Texas
Insurance Code violations.”304 The trial court in the coverage case even-
tually found that the insurer was liable for the damages the underlying
plaintiffs recovered against the insured, and an appeal followed.
In rejecting the insurer’s argument that the judgment against the in-
sured “did not result from an ‘actual trial,’” the court of appeals first
determined that the insurer could not rely on this argument because it
“breached its duty to defend.”305 Turning to the insurer’s argument that
the assignment violated Gandy, the court of appeals noted that this case
was readily distinguishable from the facts in that case.306 While Gandy
involved a pre-trial assignment, the assignment in this case at bar fol-
lowed a trial on the merits.307 Second, the court of appeals found that
none of the Gandy elements were at issue.308 The court of appeals recog-
nized that in considering the validity of an assignment against an insurer,
“Gandy requires a ‘fully adversarial trial,’” which is undefined in the case
law.309 However, noting that both parties were active participants in the
underlying litigation, introducing extensive evidence, and engaging in
cross-examination of witnesses, the court of appeals found that the trial
court had been well-engaged and that the verdict resulted from a fully
adversarial trial.310 Thus, the court of appeals held that the assignment
was proper.311
The Texas Supreme Court is set to address in Seger v. Yorkshire Insur-
ance Co., Ltd.312 the interplay between the Gandy “fully adversarial trial”
requirement and its holding from Evanston Insurance Co. v. Atofina Pet-
lid as a matter of law based on Gandy because there was no judgment or agreement that
the insured had a legal obligation to pay damages to the underlying plaintiff).
302. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hamel, 444 S.W.3d 780, 803–04 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014,
pet. filed).
303. Id. at 785.
304. Id. at 787.
305. Id. at 798–99, 801.
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312. No. 13-0673, 2016 Tex. LEXIS 503 (Tex. June 17, 2016). When this article was
drafted, the Texas Supreme Court had yet to address this issue.
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rochemicals Inc., where it found that a liability insurer that wrongfully
denies coverage to its insured cannot later challenge the reasonableness
of the amount of the insured’s settlement with a third-party claimant.313
In doing so, the supreme court will hopefully provide practitioners with
additional guidance on the requirements for an underlying judgment or
settlement to be binding on a liability insurer.
313. See Evanston Ins. Co. v. Atofina Petrochemicals Inc., 256 S.W.3d 660, 674 (Tex.
2008).
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